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Article 
WHY THE AIRPORT AND COURTHOUSE 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO 
SPORTING EVENTS 
Benjamin T. Clark* 
Attending sporting events is one of America’s favorite pastimes.1  
Illegal alcohol consumption and drug use unfortunately are 
commonplace at these events.2  Because collegiate games often draw tens 
of thousands of fans,3 a greater concern is that one could become the 
target of a terrorist attack.  Prior to September 11, 2001, courts repeatedly 
struck down warrantless searches of patrons entering sporting and other 
entertainment events.4  In so holding, courts refused to draw an analogy 
between searches at sporting events and warrantless searches that have 
been upheld at airports and courthouses. 
This Article revisits that analogy and argues that considering the 
magnitude and likelihood of the threat, searches of patrons at collegiate 
sporting events should be viewed in the same light as airport and 
courthouse searches.  Stated differently, an exception to the search 
warrant requirement should be created for searches of patrons at 
sporting events.  Part I of this Article explains that sporting events are an 
                                                 
* Mr. Clark graduated from the University of Iowa College of Law, where he was 
elected to the Order of the Coif.  He currently practices with Spencer Fane Britt & Browne, 
LLP in Kansas City, Missouri.  The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of 
the author. 
1 For example, during the 2004 college football season, a total of 4,591,722 fans attended 
Big 10 Conference games.  Big 10 Home Page, http://bigten.collegesports.com/sports/m-
footbl/spec-rel/010605aaa.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
2 In the fall of 2000, the author attended all of the University of Iowa home football 
games.  Fans swilling alcohol out of flasks or other devices during the games was 
commonplace. 
3 In 2004, the University of Michigan alone averaged 111,025 patrons at its six home 
football games.  Big 10 Home Page, supra note 1. As explained below, searches of patrons by 
public institutions will more likely trigger the state action requirement than searches of 
patrons at professional games.  Therefore, this Article focuses primarily on collegiate 
sporting events. 
4 Because case law is relatively sparse with respect to searches at sporting events, this 
Article also analyzes case law relating to similar events such as rock concerts.  Therefore, 
the term “entertainment event” will be used throughout to describe not only sporting 
events, but also any other event where thousands of spectators could be present. 
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attractive target for terrorists.5  It further explains that because of the 
“state action” requirement, public stadiums are often more difficult to 
protect from terrorism than private stadiums.6  Part II focuses on what 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, thereby triggering 
the warrant requirement.7 
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant in 
order to conduct a search, Part III explains that courts have tempered 
that requirement with narrow exceptions.8  Part III also discusses three 
specific exceptions that could apply to warrantless searches of patrons 
attending entertainment events.9  Part IV analyzes cases decided both 
before and after September 11, 2001, that address the similarities and 
differences between airports, courthouses, and sports stadiums.10  Part V 
argues that the need for warrantless searches at stadiums is at least 
equally, if not more, compelling than warrantless searches at airports 
and courthouses.11  Therefore, an exception to the warrant requirement 
should be created for stadium searches. 
At the outset, it must be noted that the purpose of this Article is not 
to stir the emotional debate over an actual or perceived erosion of civil 
liberties after September 11, 2001.12  Instead, it is focused on the more 
narrow issue of whether, as a matter of fact and law, stadium searches 
are sufficiently similar to airport and courthouse searches, such that an 
exception to the warrant requirement should be created for searches at 
sporting events. 
                                                 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra Part V. 
12 See Bourgeosis v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that “September 
11, 2001, already a day of immeasurable tragedy, cannot be the day liberty perished in this 
country”).  To be sure, our civil liberties must be vigilantly protected.  Rather than trigger 
an emotional debate, this Artcle is intended to create an intellectual discussion on the 
applicability of airport and courthouse searches to stadium searches.  The discussion is 
particularly timely in light of the recently promulgated National Football League search 
policy, discussed below. 
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I.  SPORTING EVENTS–IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF TERRORISTS 
A. An Undeniable Threat  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) defines terrorism as an 
act or acts dangerous to human life that are “intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government, or 
affect the conduct of a government.”13  According to the FBI, sporting 
events present a unique and attractive opportunity for both domestic 
and foreign terrorists.14  The basis for this conclusion is simple. 
To a terrorist, a major sporting event possesses all the desirable traits 
of a successful attack.  These traits are (1) a soft target, (2) a large number 
of Americans, and (3) major media attention.15  With respect to the first 
characteristic, a terrorist could surreptitiously smuggle a small amount 
of explosive material into a sporting event; indeed, merely 3.5 ounces of 
plutonium particles would be enough to kill “concentrations of people 
. . . .”16  The number of casualties could be especially high at collegiate 
football games, where many schools average more than 100,000 
spectators per contest.17 
Moreover, it is “not just the huge crowds that gather for games in 
America, but the central place sports stands in our culture that makes the 
specter of terrorists targeting a major sports event all too alarmingly 
logical.”18  “[S]ports [are] a very symbolic target of terrorism because it is 
so associated with the globalization of the American economy and the 
American culture.”19  “Young kids . . . are wearing those jerseys, they are 
                                                 
13 The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States, Testimony of Dale L. Watson, 
Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division, FBI, Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ 
congress/congress02/watson020602.htm. 
14 Emergency Survival Program Home Page, ESP Bulletin, www.cert-la.com/ESP/ 
Terrorism 2001.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
15 Robert Windrem, Athens in the Crosshairs Questions and Answers About Terrorism at the 
Olympics (2004), www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5674731/. 
16 Barry L. Rothberg, Averting Armageddon: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in the United 
States, 8 DUKE COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 110 (1997). 
17 Big 10 Home Page, supra note 1. 
18 Windrem, supra note 15; see also Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1080 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing the “logical, concern that public events at which 
large crowds gather might be targets of unidentified terrorists”). 
19 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legal Issues in Sports Security, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 349, 366 (2003). 
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wearing their Nike shirts, their Nike shoes, and the terrorists are looking 
for a symbol to target.”20 
For all these reasons, it should come as no surprise that Al-Qaida has 
expressed an interest in attacking “World Cup venues and U.S. sporting 
events—big football games.”21  For these reasons, a successful terrorist 
attack at such an event would be the crown jewel of any fanatical 
individual or group. 
B. Stadium Operators Respond to the Threat  
Cognizant that sporting events are fertile ground for terrorist acts, 
operators of professional22 and collegiate games23 implemented more 
rigorous search policies at their events following September 11, 2001.  
For example, in August of 2005, the National Football League (“NFL”) 
determined that hand searches of all patrons should be required at all 
stadiums hosting NFL games during the 2005 season.24  The policy 
generally provided that each patron would be subject to a physical pat-
down as she enters the stadium.25  Any patron that refuses the pat-down 
would be denied admittance to the game.  The primary intent behind the 
NFL pat-down policy was to “prevent terrorists from carrying explosives 
into the stadiums.”26  Not surprisingly, the NFL pat-down policy has 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 The National Football League’s recently promulgated “pat-down” policy is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
23 See University at Albany, Ongoing Commitment to Campus Security, http://www. 
albany.edu/main/security/questions.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (stating that security 
would be increased at public events, including the implementation of metal detectors, pat-
downs, and the prohibition of bags); see also Graham B. Spanier, President’s Report to The 
Pennsylvania State University Board of Trustees, http://www.psu.edu/ur/2001/ 
bot16novspanier.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (stating new security changes at college 
football games, including “no re-entry to the stadium, changed parking and traffic patterns, 
barring of knapsacks and bags at games, and a ‘no fly zone’” around the stadium). 
24 Tampa Bay Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
25 Id.; see also Kansas City Chiefs Home Page, NFL To Institute ‘Pat-Down’ Policy At Its 
Games, http://www.kcchiefs.com/news/2005/09/08/nfl_to_institute_patdown_policy_ 
at_its_games2/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) (“All persons entering Arrowhead [Stadium] will 
be subject to and should expect to be patted down by security personnel as they proceed 
through the gates.”). 
26 Tampa Bay Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078; Kansas City Chiefs Home Page, supra note 
25 (recognizing that the NFL pat-down policy “is in recognition of the significant 
additional security that ‘pat downs’ offer, as well as the favorable experience that [NFL] 
clubs and fans have had using ‘pat-downs’ as part of a comprehensive stadium security 
plan”). 
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recently been challenged as unconstitutional.27  Those challenges, which 
have found initial success, are discussed in greater detail below. 
Importantly, Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches is aimed “exclusively at state action . . . .”28  Stated differently, 
the conduct of private parties does not generally implicate the Fourth 
Amendment; “only activity by government agents implicates a person’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.”29  The constitutionality of the NFL or similar 
pat-down policy will therefore often depend on whether a public or 
private party is conducting the search. 
As a result of the state action requirement, it is often easier for 
private entities to conduct warrantless searches without running afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment.30  In sharp contrast, public entities generally 
cannot conduct searches of patrons unless a warrant is obtained or the 
search is deemed reasonable.31  This may leave public stadiums at a 
decided disadvantage in protecting its patrons from a terrorist attack.  
                                                 
27 See Tampa Bay Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078; Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 
No. CGC 05447679, Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Superior 
Court for the County of San Francisco, Cal., filed Dec. 15, 2005). 
28 United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2003).  Whether conduct 
constitutes state action is highly dependent on the specific facts at hand.  See Gallagher v. 
Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[a]s is the 
case with all of the various tests for state action, the required inquiry is fact-specific”).  The 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are discussed in greater detail below. 
29 United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
30 The contours of the “state action” requirement have been extensively examined by 
courts and commentators alike.  This Article does not delve into that murky area of law.  
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (stating that application of 
the state action doctrine “frequently admits of no easy answer”).  Instead, the Article will 
assume for the purpose of analysis that a search of patrons at a collegiate sporting event 
would constitute state action.  See Stroeber v. Comm’n Veteran’s Auditorium, 453 F. Supp. 
926, 931 (S.D. Iowa. 1977) (holding that because defendants were “acting to provide 
security for a public facility financed by pubic monies, the requisite ‘state action’ is 
present”).  It should be noted that under certain circumstances, and as explained below, a 
search conducted by a private professional franchise could also constitute state action.  
Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 93–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding state action between New 
York City and the New York Yankees for many reasons, including the fact that New York 
City had paid approximately fifty million dollars to renovate the Yankees’ stadium and 
retained the power to approve ticket prices and authorize other entities to use the stadium 
when it was not being used by the Yankees); see also Tampa Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078; 
Lawrence A. Israeloff, The Sports Fan v. The Sports Team Owner: Does a Franchise’s Prohibition 
of Spectators’ Banners Violate the First Amendment?, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 419 (1991) 
(discussing the state action doctrine with respect to private sports franchises). 
31 Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1144 (M.D.N.C. 1977).  The warrant 
requirement is discussed in greater detail below. 
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The following examines the requirements imposed on colleges and other 
state actors under the Fourth Amendment.  
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION ON WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, papers, and effects.  
Specifically, it provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized.32 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental 
officials.”33  
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States,34 Justice Harlan 
articulated a two-prong test to determine whether governmental conduct 
constitutes a search.  He recognized a “twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”35  This test has become the standard by which most 
alleged searches are judged.36 
                                                 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961).  Most states have adopted a constitutional provision that is analogous to the 
Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., People v. Saurini, 607 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) 
(recognizing that the New York Constitution contains an analogous provision to the Fourth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution). 
33 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 851 (9th Cir. 2004).  As the text itself 
demonstrates, the Fourth Amendment regulates only governmental “searches” and 
“seizures.”  Of course, a search could also involve a seizure of a person.  United States v. 
Aleman, No. CRIM.A. 05-261, 2006 WL 91777, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 2006).  For the purpose 
of consistency, this Article focuses exclusively on “searches.” 
34 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
35 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
36 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 736, 740 (1979) (recognizing that to determine whether 
a search has occurred under the Fourth Amendment, “our lodestar is Katz . . . ”). 
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A brief discussion of a well-known case illustrates how the Katz test 
is applied.  In Florida v. Riley,37 Riley lived in a mobile home located on 
five acres of rural property.38  Approximately ten to twenty feet behind 
the mobile home was a greenhouse.39  Two sides of the greenhouse were 
not enclosed, although the contents in the greenhouse were covered from 
view from surrounding properties by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home 
itself.40  The greenhouse was covered by corrugated roofing panels; some 
of the panels were translucent, others opaque.41  Two of the panels, 
which constituted approximately ten percent of the roof area, were 
missing.42  The mobile home and greenhouse were surrounded by a wire 
fence, and a “DO NOT ENTER” sign was posted on the property.43 
An anonymous tip to the county sheriff’s office indicated that 
marijuana was being grown on Riley’s property.44  However, an 
investigating officer could not see the contents of the greenhouse from 
the road.45  Not to be deterred, the officer circled twice over the property 
in a helicopter at the height of 400 feet.46  With his naked eye, the officer 
could see through the openings in the roof and through the open sides of 
the greenhouse.47  The officer thought he identified marijuana growing 
in the greenhouse.48 
Based on the officer’s observations from the helicopter, a search 
warrant was issued and a subsequent search confirmed that marijuana 
was growing in the greenhouse.49  Riley was charged with possession of 
marijuana under Florida law.50  He then filed a motion to suppress, 
arguing that the aerial surveillance of his greenhouse constituted a 
search.51  Therefore, a search warrant should have first been obtained.52 
                                                 
37 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
38 Id. at 448. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 448–49. 
50 Id. at 449. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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The United States Supreme Court rejected that argument.  Citing 
Katz, the Court first ruled that Riley “no doubt intended and expected 
that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the 
precautions he took protected against ground-level observation.”53  As a 
result, Riley had a subjective expectation of privacy and therefore 
satisfied the first Katz prong.  Yet, according to the Riley Court, society 
was not prepared to recognize his expectation of privacy as reasonable.  
Because “‘private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public 
airways is routine’ . . . Riley could not reasonably have expected that his 
greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a 
helicopter.”54  Therefore, because the officer’s actions did not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, the Riley Court held that a warrant 
was not required prior to the aerial surveillance.55 
Courts have universally recognized, often with little analysis, that 
under Katz and its progeny, patrons at entertainment events have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their persons and in items such as 
handbags, purses, and coats.56  The lack of analysis is not surprising.  It is 
beyond dispute that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with 
respect to such items.  As a result, any physical inspection of such objects 
triggers the protection of the Fourth Amendment.57 
III.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT   
If the Katz prongs are satisfied, then a search is constitutionally 
permissible only if:  (1) a search warrant is properly obtained58 or (2) the 
                                                 
53 Id. at 450.  As discussed above, these precautions included a wire fence surrounding 
the mobile home and greenhouse, along with a “DO NOT ENTER” sign that was posted on 
the property. 
54 Id. at 450–51 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)). 
55 Riley, 488 U.S. at 449. 
56 See, e.g., Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 946, 948 (Haw. 1981) (striking down a search 
policy that inspected handbags, coats, jackets, and shoulderbags). 
57 State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Iowa 1978); see also United States v. Barth, 26 F. 
Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (recognizing that “a warrant is usually required to 
search the contents of a closed container, because the owner’s expectation of privacy relates 
to the contents of that container rather than to the container itself”). 
58 The process for obtaining a search warrant is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Generally, if a police officer seeks a search warrant, she must establish probable cause to a 
magistrate judge.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (defining probable 
cause as “[r]easonable grounds for belief that a person should be arrested or searched”).  At 
that time, the officer must sign an affidavit explaining the basis for her suspicion.  
Assuming that the magistrate finds the affidavit persuasive, the search warrant must 
outline the specific person or location that may be searched.  See generally Rebecca Strauss, 
We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 879–80 (2002) (describing the process of obtaining a search warrant). 
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search is reasonable.59  As one court stated:  “The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.  The Fourth Amendment does not 
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes 
those which are unreasonable.”60  Therefore, “warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable.”61  This per se rule is “subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,”62 which 
“provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, 
such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of 
evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral 
magistrate.”63 
In carving out exceptions to the warrant requirement, courts 
generally engage in a tripartite weighing of public necessity, efficacy of 
the search, and degree of the intrusion.64  A non-exhaustive list of 
warrantless searches that courts have deemed reasonable include: 
consensual searches,65 stop and frisk searches,66 airport and courthouse 
searches,67 hot pursuit searches,68 border searches,69 searches incident to 
arrest,70 and random drug testing of high school athletes.71 
With respect to sporting events, three exceptions to the warrant 
requirement could apply that might justify warrantless searches.  These 
exceptions are:  (1) consensual searches, (2) the Terry stop and frisk 
search, and most importantly, (3) airport and courthouse searches.  
These exceptions are discussed in turn. 
                                                 
59 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
60 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
61 Id.; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). 
62 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
63 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979). 
64 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967) (balancing the need to 
search against the invasion that the search entails); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 
1362–64 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (stating that to determine the reasonableness of a search, a court 
should weigh public necessity, effectiveness of the search, and degree of the intrusion).  
These three factors are discussed in greater detail below.  In all cases, the government bears 
the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within an exception.  Jacobsen v. City 
of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 655 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
65 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
66 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
67 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973). 
68 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
69 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
70 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
71 Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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A.  Conditional Entry and Implied Consent 
If voluntary consent is obtained, the lack of a search warrant is of no 
consequence.72  The question of voluntariness depends upon the “totality 
of all the surrounding circumstances.”73  Such relevant circumstances fall 
into two categories:  the external coercion placed upon the individual 
and the internal, subjective strength of the individual.74  The external 
coercion inquiry focuses on factors such as the number of officers 
present, whether the officers are in uniform, and whether the officers 
display a weapon.75  The subjective strength of an individual to confer 
consent turns on intelligence, age, prior experience with law 
enforcement, and knowledge of the right to refuse to give consent.76 
Several courts have considered whether a patron consented to a 
warrantless search at sporting77 and other entertainment events.78  Two 
issues frequently arise in those cases.  The first issue is whether 
spectators can be required to submit to a search for alcohol, drugs, or 
weapons as a condition for entry into the event.  The second issue is 
whether a patron impliedly consents to a search by seeking admittance 
to a sporting event when she is previously notified that she may be 
searched prior to entry. 
It appears well settled that, standing alone, conditioning public 
access on submission to a search is unconstitutional.79  For example, in 
Gaioni v. Folmar,80 the city of Montgomery, Alabama, opened its civic 
center to host various public events, such as professional wrestling 
                                                 
72 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). 
73 Id. at 226. 
74 Id. at 229 (finding that consent was achieved through subtly coercive police questions 
and the vulnerable subjective state of the person). 
75 See Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 951 (Haw. 1981) (finding lack of consent where a 
patron was approached by a uniformed security guard who stated that he had to inspect 
patron’s handbag for bottles or cans). 
76 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. 
77 Jeffers v. Heavrin, 932 F.2d 1160, 1161 (6th Cir. 1991) (examining the policy of 
searching racetrack patrons); Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982) (examining the policy of searching patrons at professional football games). 
78 Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14–15 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (examining the policy of 
searching patrons attending rock concerts); Stroeber v. Comm’n Veteran’s Auditorium, 453 
F. Supp. 926, 933 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (also examining the policy of searching patrons attending 
rock concerts); Florida v. Iaccarino, 767 So. 2d 470, 476 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (examining the 
policy of searching patrons at music festivals). 
79 Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1149 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Nakamoto, 635 P.2d at 
951–52. 
80 460 F. Supp. at 10. 
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matches and rock concerts.81  To curb the illegal use of marijuana and 
alcohol by spectators, the city initiated a program to search patrons.82  As 
patrons passed through the turnstiles, approximately sixty to seventy 
percent were stopped by police.83  The selected ticket holders were 
ordered to open their coats, bulging pockets were patted down, and the 
contents of pocketbooks were also inspected.84 
At one particular rock concert, twenty-two adults were arrested for 
drug offenses and twenty juveniles were arrested for possession of 
alcohol or marijuana.85  Several individuals subjected to a search filed 
suit, alleging that the search policy violated the Fourth Amendment.86  
The Gaioni court agreed and struck down the search policy as 
unconstitutional.87 
The defendants argued that the patrons voluntarily consented to the 
search because signs were posted at the entrances warning patrons that 
they could be searched.88  The district court flatly rejected this argument, 
holding: 
[D]efendants cannot condition public access . . . on 
submission to a search and then claim those subjected to 
the searches voluntarily consented. . . .  Any consent 
obtained under such circumstances was an inherent 
product of coercion, since people undoubtedly felt if 
they refused to be searched they would forfeit their right 
to attend the concert.”89 
Based on Giaoni and similar cases, it appears that a stadium operator 
cannot condition a spectator’s admission to a sporting event on consent 
to a search. 90 
Similarly, courts have skeptically viewed the doctrine of implied 
consent as a justification for warrantless searches.  To determine whether 
patrons impliedly consent to a search, courts generally examine several 
                                                 
81 Id. at 11. 
82 Id. at 11–12. 
83 Id. at 12 n.6. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 15. 
88 Id. at 14. 
89 Id. 
90  See id. 
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factors:  (1) whether the patron was aware that her conduct would 
subject her to a search,91 (2) whether the search was supported by a “vital 
interest,”92 (3) whether the officer possessed apparent authority to 
conduct the search,93 (4) whether the patron was advised of her right to 
refuse the search,94 and (5) whether refusal would result in a deprivation 
of a benefit or a right.95 
Applying these factors, courts have repeatedly refused to find 
implied consent at entertainment events.96  For example, in Stroeber v. 
Commission Veteran’s Auditorium,97 the plaintiffs brought suit alleging 
that search procedures conducted at Veteran’s Memorial Auditorium 
(“Auditorium”) in Des Moines, Iowa, were unconstitutional.98  Prior to 
entering the Auditorium, patrons were not informed that they could be 
searched for contraband or other items.99  However, a warning sign was 
posted near the doors between the lobby, where tickets were sold, and 
the inside foyer, where tickets were taken.100  The sign stated:  “It is 
illegal to bring a controlled substance or any alcoholic beverages onto 
these premises.  All persons must be seated in the chairs provided.  
Violators will be prosecuted.”101  In addition, a tape recording ran 
through the loudspeakers in the lobby area.102  The taped message was 
less than one minute long, and it warned patrons that they could be 
checked for contraband.103 
                                                 
91 McGann v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1993) (en 
banc). 
92 Id. 
93 Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1147 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
94 Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 15 (M.D. Ala. 1978). 
95 Id. 
96 Stroeber v. Comm’n Veteran’s Auditorium, 453 F. Supp. 926, 933 (S.D. Iowa 1977); 
Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1976); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 
387 (Iowa 1978). 
97 453 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Iowa 1977). 
98 Id. at 928. 
99 Id. at 929. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 929 n.1. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  In its entirety, the tape recording warned the following: 
No alcoholic beverages, pop or controlled drug substances are 
permitted to be in the auditorium.  No smoking is allowed in the 
seating area.  Smoking is permitted only in the hallways or restrooms.  
For the safety of those admitted to the seating area, you may be 
checked to see that these auditorium rules are complied with. 
Id. at 930 n.2. 
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The defendants argued that patrons impliedly consented to be 
searched if they voluntarily entered the Auditorium in spite of the sign 
and tape-recorded warning.104  The Stroeber court disagreed, ruling that 
“a sign and a tape recording in a crowed and noisy lobby, are 
inadequate.”105  The court noted that the sign did not mention a search, 
and the tape recording merely mentioned a “check.”106  Also, the sign 
and tape recording did not inform patrons that a search could be refused 
and that they could, upon refusal, obtain a refund of their ticket price.107  
As the policy was applied, “a random number of patrons are suddenly 
confronted by armed uniform police officers and told that their 
admission to the concert is conditioned upon their submission to a 
physical search of their person and personal effects.”108  The court 
concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances, which are marked by 
coercion and duress, the Court cannot possibly conclude that any 
ensuing consent to search was of a voluntary nature.”109  
B. Terry Stop and Frisks  
On a more limited basis, the Terry stop-and-frisk exception could 
also apply to sporting events.  In Terry v. Ohio,110 the United States 
Supreme Court adopted a flexible standard of reasonableness to 
searches.  Specifically, the Court held that under the Fourth Amendment: 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that 
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection 
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an 
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him.111 
Under Terry, an officer need not establish probable cause but must be 
able “to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
                                                 
104 Id. at 933. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  Although not expressly stated, it appears the Stroeber court would have rejected 
any consent given as coerced, whether express or implied. 
110 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
111 Id. at 30. 
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rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.”112  However, to justify a stop-and-frisk search, the search 
must focus on a particular individual, and the officer must demonstrate 
that there was specific cause for the officer to fear bodily harm.113 
Terry has been frequently offered as a justification for warrantless 
searches at sporting and similar events.  Yet, just as frequently courts 
have rejected that justification for two primary reasons.114  First, prior to 
the search, the officer lacked an articulable suspicion that the patron was 
“armed and presently dangerous.”115  Second, the search policies were 
not limited to uncovering lethal weapons.116 
For example, in Collier v. Miller,117 the defendants enacted a search 
policy to “promote the health and safety of all those involved in any way 
with the special events held in Hofheinz Pavillion and Jeppesen 
Stadium” on the University of Houston (“University”) campus.118  The 
policy prohibited patrons from entering either facility with containers or 
packages that could conceal alcoholic beverages, cans, or bottles, unless 
the patron allowed the package to be opened and examined.119  If the 
patron refused, the University could deny admittance.120  The search 
policy was challenged as unconstitutional, and the defendants relied, in 
part, on the Terry doctrine.121 
Rejecting that argument, the Collier court ruled that in contrast to 
Terry, the search policy was not limited to searches for inherently lethal 
weapons.122  Instead, “it [sought] to exclude items which could pose a 
danger to the public only if misused.”123  The court concluded by 
refusing to read Terry to “sanction wholesale searches of the general 
                                                 
112 Id. at 21. 
113 Stroeber, 453 F. Supp. at 932. 
114 Id.; Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Collier v. Miller, 414 
F. Supp. 1357, 1365 (S.D. Tex. 1977). 
115 Collier, 414 F.Supp. at 1365 (noting that the stadium searches were “conducted without 
any basis for suspicion”). 
116 Wheaton, 435 F.Supp. at 1146 (noting that “the policy in force at the coliseum is not 
limited to searches for inherently lethal weapons”). 
117 414 F. Supp. 1357. 
118 Id. at 1360. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 1364. 
122 Id. at 1365. 
123 Id.  These items included bottles and cans. 
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public in the absence of exigent circumstances, regardless of the 
searching official’s valid interest in preventing potential injuries.”124 
The case law discussed above demonstrates that courts have 
uniformly struck down searches of patrons that were based on consent 
or conducted under Terry.  However, the airport and courthouse 
exception provides more hope in protecting patrons at sporting events.  
This exception is discussed below. 
C. The Airport and Courthouse Exceptions   
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a “wake of 
unprecedented airport bombings, aircraft piracy and courtroom 
violence.”125  To help curb this violence, courts created an exception to 
the warrant requirement that allowed warrantless searches at airports 
and courthouses.126  In creating this exception, courts balanced the three 
factors of public necessity, efficacy of the search, and the degree and 
nature of the intrusion.127  These factors, and how they applied to 
airports and courthouses, are discussed in turn.  
1. Public Necessity  
The public necessity inquiry examines the nature of the threat to 
public safety along with the likelihood that such threat will transpire.128  
In airports and courthouses, the nature of the threat to public safety was 
significant—death or serious injury to a substantial number of persons 
by a bomb or other explosive were distinct possibilities.129  The 
likelihood of that threat was also high.  In the early 1970s, when the 
airport exception was recognized, over 387 attempts were made to hijack 
aircrafts.130  Courthouses were also not safe.  One court took judicial 
                                                 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1362. 
126 Id.; see also United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); Downing v. 
Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972). 
127 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275. 
128 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (considering the 
constitutionality of airport searches).  The United States Supreme Court has considered the 
“public necessity” for a warrantless search in several contexts.  See Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 453 (1990) (holding that because a temporary checkpoint 
was enacted to combat drunken driving, a “serious public danger” of considerable 
“magnitude,” it was thus constitutional). 
129 Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362. 
130 United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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notice131 of widespread violence in courtrooms.132  The threat of death or 
serious injury, in conjunction with a high likelihood of its occurrence, 
weighed in favor of creating a warrant exception at airports and 
courthouses.  
2. The Efficacy of the Search 
The efficacy of the search inquiry considers “the likelihood that the 
search procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm.”133  In 
both airport and courthouse searches, a magnetometer is often used to 
detect the presence of metal,134 which suggests that an individual could 
be carrying a bomb, knife, gun, or other weapon.135  Further, no 
particular individual is singled out for a magnetometer search.  Instead, 
the magnetometer casts a wide net by indiscriminately searching all 
persons.  In addition, courts have repeatedly recognized that “the 
overwhelming majority of weapons will respond to [the] 
magnetometer.”136  For all these reasons, courts uniformly found that 
magnetometer searches at airports and courthouses were highly effective 
in averting physical injuries or death.  
3. The Degree and Nature of the Intrusion  
Lastly, the degree and nature of the intrusion on an individual’s 
privacy interests are considered.137  This inquiry has a subjective and an 
objective component.  Subjectively, at airports and courthouses, each 
individual must undergo a magnetometer search.  Because all persons 
are searched, no stigma attaches to embarrass the individual.138  In other 
words, no individual is singled out and treated differently based on 
color, national origin, appearance, or mannerisms.  Moreover, courts 
                                                 
131 A judicially noticed fact is one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or (2) capable of accurate 
and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned.  FED. R. EVID. 201. 
132 Downing, 454 F.2d at 1231 n.1 (taking judicial notice of “violent outbreaks across the 
country and the consequent dangers and hazards to public property and the Government’s 
officers and employees”). 
133 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275. 
134 Courts have repeatedly held that the use of a magnetometer constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.  United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972) 
(recognizing that “the very purpose and function of a magnetometer” is to “search for 
metal and disclose its presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy”). 
135 United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974). 
136 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1974). 
137 See Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275. 
138 Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
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have ruled that a magnetometer “does not annoy, frighten or humiliate 
those who pass through it.”139  Therefore, the nature of the intrusion is 
minimal. 
Objectively, a magnetometer search is limited in both its scope and 
purpose.140  Passing through a metal detector normally takes a matter of 
seconds.  Unless the metal detector is triggered, the individual is not 
detained.141  In addition, the sole purpose of the search is to determine 
whether an individual might be carrying a dangerous weapon or similar 
object.142  Due to the “absolutely minimal invasion of privacy involved,” 
courts repeatedly held that this final factor also weighed in favor of an 
exception to the search warrant at airports and courthouses.143 
IV.  CASE LAW ADDRESSING THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
AIRPORTS, COURTHOUSES, AND STADIUMS  
Governmental entities and other state actors have often argued that 
warrantless searches at stadiums are analogous to warrantless searches 
at airports and courthouses.144  To date, that argument has not been well-
received.  Indeed, courts have “uniformly rejected” that analogy.145  
However, the vast majority of these cases were decided prior to the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  The threat of terrorism is now 
always present, and an attack on a sporting event is an unfortunate 
possibility. 146 
Part IV.A examines two cases that were brought prior to September 
11, 2001, and that examined a potential analogy between airports, 
courthouses, and stadiums.147  The first case is representative of most in 
                                                 
139 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806. 
140 Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771. 
141 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Wheaton, 435 F. Supp. at 1145; Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 
1976); Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 953 (Haw. 1981); Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 
N.W.2d 619, 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (Wash. 
1983) (en banc). 
145 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS & CONFESSIONS ch. 16, § 16.18 
(2005). 
146 See North Dakota v. Segler, 700 N.W.2d 702, 708 (N.D. 2005) (stating that the State of 
North Dakota argued that cases prior to September 11, 2001, are no longer persuasive with 
respect to stadium searches because “the country has a greater need for security now than 
when [those] cases were decided . . .”). 
147 See infra Part IV.A. 
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that it rejects such an analogy.148  The second, an outlier case, recognized 
that stadiums are similar to airports and courthouses.149  Consequently, 
that court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement at 
professional football games.150  Part IV.B examines a recently decided 
case that enjoined the NFL pat-down policy from being applied at one 
NFL stadium.151  That case is important because it demonstrates that 
courts remain reluctant to create an exception for warrantless stadium 
searches.152 
A. Case Law Addressing the Analogy Prior to September 11, 2001 
Jacobsen v. City of Seattle153 is representative of many cases that 
refused to extend the airport and courthouse exception to entertainment 
events.154  In Jacobsen, there were “frequent violations of the law” at the 
Seattle Center Coliseum (“Coliseum”) during rock concerts.155  These 
violations included the “throwing of hard and dangerous objects by 
some of those attending the concerts.”156  In response, the Seattle Police 
Department began conducting warrantless pat-down searches of rock 
concert patrons at the Coliseum.157  The searches were designed to 
prevent patrons from carrying alcoholic beverages, explosive devices, 
weapons, and other dangerous objects.158 
At a Grateful Dead concert, the Jacobsen plaintiffs were searched for 
contraband.159  They filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and 
civil damages, alleging that the warrantless searches were 
unconstitutional.160  In response, the defendants did not claim that the 
searches were conducted pursuant to Terry or that the patrons consented 
to the search.161  Instead, they claimed a “new” exception for rock 
                                                 
148 See infra Part IV.A. 
149 See infra Part IV.A. 
150 See infra Part IV.A. 
151 See infra Part IV.B. 
152 See infra Part IV.B. 
153 658 P.2d 653 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
154 Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 13–14 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. 
Supp. 1134, 1145–46 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362–64 (S.D. Tex. 
1976); Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 953 (Haw. 1981). 
155 Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 654. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 655. 
161 Id. at 656. 
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concerts, “asserting that warrantless searches at rock concerts are 
analogous to those at courthouses and at airports.”162 
The court began its analysis by recognizing that “[t]o determine the 
constitutionality of airport and courthouse searches, courts have 
considered three factors of public security:  efficacy of the search and the 
degree and nature of the intrusion involved.”163  With respect to public 
security, the court found that although there were serious security 
concerns at the Coliseum, “the situations at a rock concert are not 
comparable to the dangers posed at airports and courthouses.”164  The 
court then quoted Wheaton v. Hagan:165  
[T]errorist efforts to bomb courthouses threatened to 
undermine the rule of law, while the attempts to blow 
up airplanes were often linked to aircraft hijackings.  As 
unruly as patrons at the Coliseum might have been and 
as great a show of violence as might have occurred with 
the throwing of a bottle at a performer and the 
successful attempt to prevent a policeman from making 
an arrest, the dangers posed by these actions are 
substantially less than those which justified suspending 
the warrant requirement in courthouse and airport 
searches.  This does not mean that the disruption of 
Coliseum events is not a cause for alarm or concern, but 
rather to suggest that other less constitutionally 
questionable actions should be employed to control the 
behavior of those attending activities at the Coliseum.166  
Inexplicably, the Jacobsen court failed to analyze the efficacy of the 
search.  Namely, the court did not discuss whether violence or illegal 
acts were curtailed as a result of searches at the Coliseum.  Instead, the 
court  focused on the degree and nature of the search.  The court ruled 
that “in contrast to the high degree of intrusion in the pat-down frisk 
employed by the Seattle police, both airport searches which are 
conducted with a magnetometer and courtroom searches which employ 
                                                 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1134 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
166 Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656. 
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a brief stop and a visual examination of packages, pocketbooks, and 
briefcases are far less intrusive.”167 
After making these findings, the court struck down the searches as 
unconstitutional.168  In so holding, the court found that the searches “are 
not analogous to airport or courthouse searches nor do they come under 
any other exception to the warrant requirement . . . .”169  “No special 
exemption from constitutional protections should be made for rock 
concerts or other gatherings in public arenas.”170 
In contrast, one outlier case prior to September 11, 2001, did 
recognize an analogy between airport and courthouse searches and 
stadium searches.  In Jensen v. City of Pontiac,171 Jolynne Jensen attended a 
professional football game at the Pontiac Silverdome (“Silverdome”).  
Before she passed through the turnstile at the entrance of the stadium, 
she was stopped by a uniformed stadium security guard.172  The guard 
requested that Jensen open her purse, and she complied.173  The guard 
then visually inspected the contents of her purse; however, the guard did 
not physically touch Jensen or her purse.174 
The search of Jensen’s purse was conducted pursuant to a search 
procedure initiated for all events at the Silverdome.  The procedure was 
primarily designed to protect both spectators and performers from injury 
due to thrown projectiles.175  Prior to entering the turnstile, a guard could 
stop any person carrying a container large enough to carry bottles, cans, 
or “other missile-like objects of similar size.”176  If stopped, the guard 
would ask the patron for permission to visually inspect the container.177  
The patron would be informed that she could refuse inspection.178  If 
permission was refused, the patron was given the option of disposing of 
the container, after which admission would be allowed.179  If the patron 
refused to allow visual inspection or refused to dispose of the container, 
                                                 
167 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 317 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
172 Id. at 620. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  A secondary purpose was to comply with a Michigan law, which required that 
only alcoholic beverages bought on the premises could be consumed there.  Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 620. 
179 Id. 
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admission to the event was denied.180  The patron could then receive a 
refund of her ticket price.181 
A four-foot by four-foot sign was posted at each gate into the 
stadium.182  The sign stated: 
NOTICE:  FOR YOUR PROTECTION BOTTLES, CANS, 
LIQUOR CONTAINERS, HORNS OR OTHER MISSLE 
[sic]-LIKE OBJECTS ARE NOT PERMITTED IN 
STADIUM.  PLEAS [sic] RETURN SUCH ITEMS TO 
YOUR VEHICLE.  PATRONS SUBJECT TO VISUAL 
INSPECTION OF PERSON, PARCELS, BAGS AND 
CONTAINERS OR CLOTHING CAPABLE OF 
CARRYING SUCH ITEMS.  PATRONS MAY REFUSE 
INSPECTION.  IF SO, MANAGEMENT MAY REFUSE 
ENTRY.183 
Jensen did not allege mistreatment during her search.184  Instead, she 
sought a declaratory ruling that the Silverdome’s search policy was 
unconstitutional.185  The Michigan Court of Appeals did not oblige, and 
it upheld the warrantless search policy.186 
The court began its analysis by considering the “three factors which 
courts have relied upon in determining that warrantless searches in 
airports and courthouses are constitutional:  (1) the public necessity, (2) 
the efficacy of the search and (3) the degree and nature of the intrusion 
involved.”187  With respect to public necessity, the evidence established 
that football games at the Silverdome encouraged violence in the stands 
and that the violence varied with the team’s performance.188  Moreover, 
the search policy was enacted in response to “widespread injuries to 
patrons which occurred as a result of thrown objects.”189  In that regard, 
the court recognized that the “seating arrangement at football games” 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 624. 
187 Id. at 622. 
188 Id. at 623.  In limiting its holding to football games, the court specifically noted that 
there was a lack of public necessity to justify warrantless searches at other events, “such as 
antique car shows, tractor pulls and dog shows.”  Id. at 623 n.3. 
189 Id. at 623. 
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created a “unique problem in that objects thrown from seats above gain 
potentially fatal velocity and nearly always strike an unsuspecting 
patron in the head or shoulder region.”190  Although the “injury being 
protected against occurs to individual patrons one at a time rather than 
the spectacular catastrophes possible in airplane bombings . . . the injury 
is still potentially fatal and always as unexpected.”191  Consequently, 
“[t]here is then a necessity, recognized by this [c]ourt and we believe the 
general public, to protect patrons at a public stadium from the harm 
inflicted by unknown assailants throwing container-type objects.”192 
The court next examined the efficacy of the search policy.  Here, the 
plaintiff admitted that after the policy’s implementation, the number of 
injuries declined.193  Further, the policy required every patron to be 
searched.194  The court ruled that this “nondiscretionary procedure 
should be very effective in stopping the flow of missile-like containers 
into the Silverdome.”195  
Finally, the court balanced the public necessity and efficacy of the 
search with the degree and nature of the intrusion involved.  In terms of 
the degree of the invasion, the patrons were told that they did not have 
to submit to the search and could instead obtain a refund of their ticket 
price.196  Moreover, the policy only called for guards to visually inspect 
the patrons and their property.197  Although the patrons could be asked 
to move items within their containers to facilitate inspection, the guards 
were specifically instructed not to physically touch patrons or their 
belongings.198  Under these facts, the court found the degree of the 
invasion minor, especially when compared with other search policies 
where patrons were physically patted down.199 
The court similarly found that the nature of the search was 
insignificant.200  As all patrons were subject to a search, the 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 623–24. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. (citing several cases, including Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146 (M.D.N.C. 
1977), where the searches were struck down as unconstitutional). 
200 Jensen, 317 N.W.2d at 624. 
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“objectionable discretion element is thereby removed . . . .”201  Because 
no individual was singled out, no stigma would attach to the searched 
individual.202  After balancing all three factors, the court held that the 
search policy was “constitutional as applied to professional football 
games.”203 
B. Case Law Revisiting the Analogy After September 11, 2001  
After September 11, 2001, few reported cases have revisited the 
analogy between searches at stadiums and airports and courthouses.  
The cases that have been reported were decided very recently and 
address the newly promulgated NFL pat-down policy described above.  
One such case is Tampa Sports Authority v. Johnston.204 
In Tampa Sports Authority, the plaintiff Gordon Johnston was a 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers (“Buccaneers”) season ticket holder.205  Johnston 
renewed his season tickets in spring of 2005 for the 2005 football 
season.206  Upon renewal that spring, Johnston was not informed that he 
would be subjected to a pat-down search prior to entering Raymond 
James Stadium, home of the Buccaneers.207 
The Tampa Sports Authority (“TSA”) was created by Florida law to 
maintain sports facilities for the residents of Tampa and Hillsborough 
County, Florida.208  Accordingly, the TSA maintains Raymond James 
Stadium.209  Raymond James Stadium is a publicly owned stadium and 
has a capacity of 65,000.210 
As explained above, in August of 2005, the NFL created a pat-down 
policy, which provided that all patrons must be physically searched 
before entering any NFL game.211  The pat-down policy was designed in 
part to “prevent terrorists from carrying explosives into the stadiums.”212  
The Buccaneers requested that the TSA adopt the NFL policy at 
                                                 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 914 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
205 Id. at 1078. 
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Raymond James Stadium.213  The TSA complied and adopted the pat-
down policy on September 13, 2005. 214 
When Johnston learned of the policy, he contacted the Buccaneers to 
complain about it.215  The Buccaneers informed Johnston that he could 
not receive a refund for his season tickets.216  He was also told that even 
if a refund was possible, he would be placed at the end of a “100,000-
person waiting list” should he wish to purchase future season tickets.217 
In response, Johnston filed an emergency request for a preliminary 
injunction in Florida state court.218  In his motion, Johnston argued that 
the warrantless pat downs, without the support of any particularized 
suspicion, violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.219  Specifically, he stated in part that “NFL fans should not be 
forced to abandon their constitutional rights at the stadium gate under 
the dubious guise of security.”220 
To decide whether Johnston was entitled to an injunction, the trial 
court weighed four factors as required by Florida law:  (1) the likelihood 
of irreparable harm, (2) the lack of an adequate remedy at law, (3) the 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) whether the 
public interest would be served by granting the injunction.221 
The trial court first found that Johnston would suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.222  Specifically, the court 
noted that Johnston was not provided notice of the pat-down policy until 
after he paid for his season tickets.223  When Johnston learned of the 
policy and complained about it, the Buccaneers refused to give him a 
refund.224  Under these circumstances, the trial court found that 
                                                 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Johnston v. Tampa Bay Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Emergency Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Hillsborough County, Fla. 
2005). 
221 See, e.g., Charlotte County v. Vetter, 863 So. 2d 465, 468–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
222 See id. at 469. 
223 Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 2 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005). 
224 Tampa Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1078 (describing the factual background presented in 
the lower court). 
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“Johnston will be irreparably harmed if TSA continues its policy of 
requiring these pat-down searches because (as explained later), he will 
be forced to undergo a search in violation of his Florida constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable government-directed searches.”225 
The court next found that Johnston did not have an adequate 
remedy at law.226  In that regard, the court summarily found that money 
damages could not compensate Johnston for invading his right to be free 
from unconstitutional searches.227 
The court’s third and most important consideration was whether 
Johnston had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his 
claim.228  TSA presented a number of arguments to establish that 
Johnston’s constitutional claim was without merit.229  TSA initially 
argued that it is not a state actor and therefore not restricted by the 
Florida Constitution.230  However, the court noted that TSA was a public 
agency, created by the Florida legislature “for the purpose of planning, 
developing, and maintaining a comprehensive complex of sports and 
recreation facilities for the use and enjoyment of the citizens of Tampa 
and Hillsborough County, as a public purpose.”231  Further, although a 
private security company performed the searches, the searches were 
conducted under the direction and at the behest of TSA.232  The pat-
down policy was also funded by taxpayer dollars.233  Under these 
circumstances, the trial court concluded that TSA was a state actor.234 
The court next noted that Article I, section 12 of the Florida 
Constitution provides the same protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures as the U.S. Constitution.235  The court easily concluded that 
Johnston had a reasonable expectation of privacy in avoiding the search, 
stating that “[e]ven if Mr. Johnston might be inadvertently jostled by 
                                                 
225 Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 2 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 3–7. 
230 Id. at 3. 
231 Id. (quoting Florida v. Tampa Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 1966)). 
232 Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 3–4 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005). 
233 Id. at 4. 
234 Id. (citing Florida v. Iaccarino, 767 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
off-duty officers that were hired by and for the benefit of a private party were state actors). 
235 Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., No. 05-09151, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Emergency 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 5 (Hillsborough County, Fla. Nov. 2, 2005). 
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other football fans while entering the gate, he still retains an expectation 
of privacy in not being forced to subject his person to unwanted 
intentional touching by state actors.”236 
Because the pat-down searches were unaccompanied by a warrant, 
TSA bore the burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant 
requirement applied.237  TSA primarily argued that special circumstances 
justified the use of pat-down searches at Buccaneers games.238  
Nonetheless, the court found that “no special circumstances exist.”239  
Specifically, the court noted the lack of a “particularized threat” to 
Raymond James Stadium.240  The evidence of such a threat included a 
telephone call to TSA approximately two years before institution of the 
pat-down policy.241  TSA did not institute a pat-down policy upon 
receipt of that threat, and after an investigation, the threat was deemed 
not credible.242 
TSA also presented evidence that downloaded images of two 
stadiums, neither of which was Raymond James Stadium, were 
discovered on computers possibly linked to terrorists.243  The court 
discounted that evidence, noting that the FBI Field Office in St. Louis, 
Missouri, found that the downloads were not a threat or even a potential 
threat.244  The final piece of evidence presented by TSA was that 
terrorists would like to target NFL games because they are an “American 
icon.”245  Again, the court found that such evidence did not amount to a 
“particularized threat.” 246 
Finally, the court found that the public interest would be served by 
preventing future unreasonable searches.247  In that regard, the court 
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stated that “September 11 is a tragedy, but it does not mean that the 
Constitution needs to be torn up and thrown out the door.” 248 
TSA immediately appealed the trial court’s decision, and under 
Florida law, the appeal automatically stayed the preliminary 
injunction.249  On appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals refused to reverse 
the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.250 
V.  PROPERLY BALANCING THE RELEVANT FACTORS DEMONSTRATES THAT 
AN EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE CREATED FOR 
STADIUM SEARCHES  
The court in Tampa Sports Authority erroneously failed to recognize 
the distinction between warrantless searches conducted before and after 
September 11, 2001.  Unlike the Tampa Sports Authority court’s 
conclusion, the balancing of public necessity, efficacy of the search, and 
degree and nature of the intrusion at a sporting event should look much 
differently today than the cases prior to September 11, 2001, discussed 
throughout this Article.  The following examines these three factors and 
demonstrates that airports, courthouses, and sporting events are 
sufficiently similar to justify an exception to the warrant requirement at 
stadiums. 
                                                 
248 Id. 
249 Tampa Sports Auth v. Johnston., 914 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing 
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.310(b)(2) (providing that a preliminary injunction is automatically stayed 
upon the filing of a notice of appeal)). 
250 Id.  The Court of Appeals lifted the automatic stay on November 4, 2005, and 
explained its reasons in an order dated November 30, 2005.  Id.  Although a detailed 
analysis of the appellate court’s ruling is not necessary, its opinion contains several 
contradictory comments that are worth noting.  As with the trial court, the appellate court 
was troubled by the “amorphous nature of the present danger to the stadium.”  Tampa 
Sports Auth., 914 So. 2d at 1080.  However, the court also recognized that the pat-down 
policy was enacted in response to a “certainly logical, concern that public events at which 
large crowds gather might be targets of unidentified terrorists.”  Id.  The appellate court 
further noted that TSA submitted expert affidavits providing that pat-down searches were 
the most effective way to detect suicide bombs.  Id. at 1081.  The court further recognized 
that “[c]onducting patdown searches may well be effective for detecting arms or 
explosives.”  Id.  Nonetheless, because TSA did not adopt the pat-down policy until two 
years after a specific threat to Raymond James Stadium, the court ruled that maintaining 
the stay would not be detrimental to TSA.  Id.  The court bolstered that conclusion by 
recognizing that “the TSA has in place a number of other measures to protect against a 
variety of security threats . . . .”  Id. 
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A.  The Pubic Necessity for Searches at Stadiums is at Least as Strong, if not 
Stronger, than the Public Necessity for Searches at Airports and 
Courthouses  
As an initial matter, it must be recognized that many cases prior to 
September 11, 2001, struck down stadium search policies designed to 
eradicate alcohol or drugs, not bombs or other explosive devices.251  
Although alcohol and drugs were often illegal at those events, they 
“present[ed] no public danger equivalent to that posed by a bomb or 
gun.”252  Thus, courts held that the “[public] necessity for the . . . searches 
is minimal compared to that for airport searches.”253  Under this 
reasoning, a stadium search conducted with the express purpose of 
eliminating bombs or other weapons of mass violence should be viewed 
in a more favorable light.  Moreover, and as discussed throughout this 
Article, the vast majority of cases examining the constitutionality of 
stadium searches were decided before September 11, 2001.  After that 
date, governmental entities have repeatedly stressed a greater need to 
conduct stadium searches.254  For these reasons, modern courts should 
not rely heavily on stadium cases decided before September 11, 2001. 
The public necessity inquiry considers the nature of the threat 
involved along with the likelihood that the threat will materialize.255  The 
nature of the threat at airports and courthouses was a matter of life and 
death, and the likelihood of that threat transpiring was high.  “The 
nature of the threat necessitating airport and courtroom searches is death 
or serious injury to a number of citizens caused by inherently lethal 
weapons or bombs.”256  In the early 1970s, when the airport exception 
was recognized, there had been 387 aircraft hijacking attempts.257  With 
respect to courthouses, one court took judicial notice of widespread 
violence in courtrooms.258 
                                                 
251 Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 13 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (striking down search policy 
designed to uncover drugs and alcohol). 
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At sporting events, the nature of the threat is even greater than at 
airports or courthouses.  Hundreds of individuals may be found at a 
particular courthouse or on a particular flight.  Compare that to the tens 
of thousands of fans that pack sports stadiums for any given event.  The 
number of individuals in harm’s way at a sporting event simply dwarfs 
the number of individuals present at any particular airplane or 
courthouse.  For example, in 2004, the Big Ten Conference averaged 
69,572 patrons per football game.259  Warrantless searches at airports and 
courthouses were upheld, in part, to protect a tiny fraction of the number 
of individuals that could be killed or injured at a sporting event.  
Therefore, the nature of the threat at stadiums is greater than the nature 
of the threat at airports and courthouses. 
The similar nature of the threat at airports, courthouses, and 
stadiums does not end with potential death or injuries.  In both contexts, 
an attack could be carried out with little warning or planning.  For 
example, in recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement at 
airports, one court noted that “modern technology has made it possible 
to miniaturize to such a degree that enough plastic explosives to blow up 
an airplane can be concealed in a toothpaste tube.”260  Commentators 
have similarly recognized that “3.5 ounces of plutonium particles would 
be enough to kill . . . concentrations of people at sporting events.”261  The 
ease with which an attack could be carried out is another similarity 
between airports, courthouses, and stadiums. 
The psychological make-up of those involved with airport and 
courthouse attacks is also strikingly similar to terrorists who may want 
to attack a sporting event.  In the airport context, one court recognized 
that “[m]any hijackers have been psychotic or political fanatics, for 
whom death holds no fear and little consequence.”262  “Unlike most 
other crimes, hijacking is one in which secrecy is not a principal concern.  
Once the hijacker decides to act, he doesn’t care if there are numerous 
witnesses.”263  These courts accurately described the terrorists who 
attacked on September 11, 2001, and similarly described those who 
would likely want to carry out an attack at a sporting event.  For all these 
                                                 
259 Big 10 Home Page, supra note 1.  In addition, an average of 5,154 fans attended each 
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reasons, the nature of the threat at stadiums is as serious, if not more 
serious, than the nature of the threat at airports and courthouses. 
The next inquiry is the likelihood of the threat at stadiums.  There 
has not yet been an attack at a sporting event.  The Tampa Bay Authority 
trial and appellate courts relied heavily upon that fact in upholding a 
preliminary injunction against the NFL pat-down policy.  The trial court 
in Tampa Bay Authority stressed the lack of a “particularized threat to 
[Raymond James Stadium],”264 and the appellate court similarly noted 
the “amorphous nature of the present danger to the stadium.”265  With 
respect to the likelihood of the threat, the Tampa Sports Authority courts 
are misguided for at least two reasons. 
First, stadium operators should not be forced to demonstrate that 
their specific stadium is under a specific threat.  It should, at the very 
least, be sufficient to demonstrate a substantial threat generally exists at 
sporting events.  By requiring greater specificity, the Tampa Bay Authority 
trial court, and others, have disregarded United States Supreme Court 
precedent to the contrary. 
For example, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,266 the 
United States Supreme Court upheld Michigan’s warrantless sobriety 
checkpoint program.267  In describing the magnitude and likelihood of 
the threat, the Court did not cite drunk driving statistics for the State of 
Michigan.  Nor did it cite even more location-specific data, such as drunk 
driving statistics for individual counties within the state.  To the 
contrary, the Court cited national drunk driving statistics, stating that 
“[d]runk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the 
same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than 
five billion dollars in property damage.”268  It therefore appears unlikely 
that the United States Supreme Court would require a specific threat to a 
specific stadium as demanded by Tampa Sports Authority.  Indeed, 
knowledge of a specific threat to a specific stadium may not be known 
until an attack has occurred or was attempted.  Because the trial court in 
Tampa Sports Authority began its analysis under a faulty premise, it is not 
surprising that it arrived at an erroneous conclusion. 
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Second, it is true that the likelihood of the threat at stadiums is not as 
concrete as the threat at airports and courthouses.  Unlike airports and 
courthouses, a sporting event has fortunately yet to be attacked.  
Nonetheless, at least one court has recognized the “certainly logical . . . 
concern that public events at which large crowds gather might be targets 
of unidentified terrorists.”269  Also, as stated above, commentators have 
similarly stressed that a sporting event would be a “very symbolic target 
of terrorism.”270  Al Qaida itself has expressed an interest in attacking 
American sporting events.271 
Under these circumstances, the likelihood of the threat at sporting 
events is not simply theoretical or amorphous.  It is real and substantial.  
However, the majority of courts would appear to require that an attack 
actually materialize before acknowledging the likelihood of the threat at 
stadiums.  That approach is misguided and reckless.  The substantial 
threat should be recognized before thousands of innocent spectators are 
harmed, not after.  Of course, September 11, 2001, does not mean that the 
“Constitution needs to be torn up and thrown out the door.”272  
However, our Constitution should not turn a blind eye to the threat at 
major sporting events.  For all these reasons, the public necessity for 
stadium searches is at least as strong, if not stronger, than the public 
necessity for searches at airports and courthouses. 
B. Stadium Searches Can Be as Effective as Those at Airports and Courthouses   
The second prong of the balancing test considers “the likelihood that 
the search procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm.”273  
Under United States Supreme Court precedent, the burden of 
establishing the efficacy of the search is not onerous.  For example, in 
Sitz,274 approximately 1.6 percent of the motorists driving through a 
warrantless sobriety checkpoint were arrested for driving under the 
influence.275  The United States Supreme Court held that such a 
percentage was sufficiently effective to justify the warrantless seizure 
created by the checkpoint.276 
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At stadiums, lower courts have subsequently required a much 
higher rate of effectiveness.  For example, in Gaioni, the court stated that 
while the defendant did seize some contraband, drug and alcohol use at 
the stadium was “not eliminated.”277  Under Gaioni, a search policy is not 
effective unless it eliminates all weapons or other contraband.  That 
unduly stringent standard should be rejected at stadiums for many 
reasons, not the least of which is that it is irreconcilable with United 
States Supreme Court precedent.278 
Because the threshold for deeming a search “effective” is low, 
properly implemented pat-down searches at stadiums can be as effective 
as searches at airports and courthouses.  In Tampa Sports Authority, the 
stadium operator presented affidavits from experts providing that pat-
down searches are “the most effective means of detecting suicide 
bombs.”279  Based on those affidavits and other evidence, the appellate 
court recognized that “[c]onducting patdown searches may well be 
effective for detecting arms or explosives.”280  Accordingly, pat-down 
searches at stadiums should be an effective way to filter out dangerous 
weapons and explosives. 
Alternatively, a magnetometer is commonly used at airports and 
courthouses to detect the presence of weapons, and is able to detect the 
“overwhelming majority of weapons . . . .”281  In addition, magnetometer 
searches have effectively deterred future crimes.  As one court stated, 
“[o]ne of the prime purposes of the search . . . is deterrence, the 
knowledge that such searches are conducted acting to deter potential 
hijackers from even attempting to bring weapons on a plane.”282 
At stadiums, a magnetometer search could be implemented in a 
manner similar to airports and courthouses.  Indeed, the magnetometer 
has already been used at high-profile games after September 11, 2001.  
                                                 
277 Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14 (M.D. Ala. 1978).  Despite using broad language, 
the Gaioni court was probably not requiring a 100% success rate before a search policy 
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v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 948, 953 (Haw. 1981). 
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For example, metal detectors were used at the 2002 Super Bowl.283  If 
metal detectors are used at a sporting event, courts should recognize that 
they are as effective as at airports and courthouses.  Specifically, searches 
by way of metal detectors would detect the “overwhelming majority of 
weapons . . . .”284  They would also deter potential wrongdoers from 
even attempting to enter the stadium with explosives or other objects. 
A metal detector search, however, may not be the ideal solution.  
With thousands of spectators entering a stadium, a metal detector search 
could be “impractical under certain circumstances . . . in terms of 
backing them all up in long lines . . . .”285  More importantly, “the 
terrorists know, as we know from September 11th, that they do not need 
to bring any metal.  So they [could] bring a plastic device [in the 
stadium].”286  Indeed, a growing concern is that a terrorist could smuggle 
in “large amounts of C4 plastic strapped to their bodies.”287  
Consequently, and as explained below, a pat-down search may be the 
most effective and efficient way to ferret out plastic explosives. 
C. Stadium Searches Must Necessarily Be More Intrusive than Searches at 
Airports and Courthouses   
The final factor that must be balanced is “the degree and nature of 
intrusion into the privacy of the person and effects of the citizen which 
the search entails.”288  As explained above, this factor contains an 
objective and subjective inquiry.  The degree of “‘objective’ intrusion . . . 
[is] measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the 
investigation.”289  The subjective inquiry considers the “fear and surprise 
engendered in law–abiding [individuals] by the nature of the stop.”290 
As explained throughout, stadium searches are designed to discover 
the same type of nefarious objects as those sought at airports and 
courthouses.  A stadium search “entails a search of the person and his 
effects.  In this respect [a stadium search] is similar to airport and 
courthouse or courtroom searches.”291  Therefore, the degree and nature 
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of the intrusion of the search is similar at airports, courthouses, and 
stadiums. 
That said, a pat-down search is more invasive than a magnetometer 
search.  However, to detect plastic explosives and similar objects, pat-
down searches at stadiums could be a necessary evil.  As stated above, 
terrorism experts have opined that “patdown searches [are] the most 
effective means of detecting suicide bombs.”292  Consequently, a pat-
down search policy is the best vehicle to detect the presence of 
explosives. 
Despite the utility of pat-down searches, prior to September 11, 2001, 
courts repeatedly struck down such searches of patrons at stadiums.293  
At least one recent case has similarly found that pat-down policies at 
stadiums are too intrusive to be upheld as constitutional.294  To help 
lessen the degree and nature of the intrusion of a pat-down search, the 
following factors should be considered when promulgating or amending 
a stadium search policy. 
First, courts have held that when a search policy is applied 
indiscriminately, and therefore not directed at isolated spectators, no 
stigma attaches to embarrass the individual subjected to the search.295  
Accordingly, any stadium pat-down policy should be applied 
indiscriminately to each patron.  The NFL pat-down policy is not 
selective; each patron must consent to the pat-down prior to admittance.  
Each patron can therefore “see that [other patrons are being searched], 
he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less 
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”296  The Tampa Sports 
Authority court completely ignored the indiscriminate nature of the NFL 
pat-down policy; other courts should not duplicate that mistake.  
Although potentially time-consuming,297 a pat-down stadium search 
should therefore be applied indiscriminately. 
                                                 
292 Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
293 See, e.g., Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 946, 949 (Haw. 1981) (striking down a search 
policy involving “actual physical inspections”). 
294 State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702, 709 (N.D. 2005) (stating that a pat-down search at a 
University of North Dakota hockey game was “very intrusive”). 
295 See, e.g., Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 656–57 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
296 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (recognizing that subjective fear is minimal at a sobriety 
checkpoint because each motorist is briefly stopped). 
297 Stadium Pat-Downs Nixed, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 1, 2005, available at http://news. 
enquirer.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2005510010361&template=printpicart (stating 
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Further, if a pat-down policy is struck down as too invasive, stadium 
operators may wish to consider a mere visual inspection. 298  Courts have 
upheld search policies where the patrons are “asked to move items 
within their containers to facilitate complete visual inspections.”299  That 
said, and as explained throughout, pat-down searches are one of the few 
ways to detect the presence of plastic explosives, especially if strapped to 
the body of a terrorist. 
After balancing all the relevant factors, an exception to the warrant 
requirement should be recognized for stadium searches.  The public 
necessity for stadium searches is as strong, if not stronger, than the 
public necessity for airport and courthouse searches.  Further, stadium 
searches can be as effective as airport and courthouse searches in 
filtering out dangerous weapons or explosives.  Finally, if appropriate 
measures are taken, the degree of the instrusion at stadiums can be 
reduced. 
D. Alternatives to Warrantless Searches at Stadiums   
If courts refuse to recognize an exception for stadium searches, other 
safety procedures could be implemented.  In this regard, courts have 
suggested several constitutional means to achieve the desired end.  All 
backpacks, parcels, or bundles larger than a particular size could be 
prohibited from the arena.300  A checkroom could be provided for such 
parcels and other objects, and the stadium could charge a fee to cover the 
cost of operating the facility.  This prohibition could deter terrorists from 
attempting to smuggle explosives or other dangerous weapons into a 
stadium.  Also, more effective policing should be maintained inside the 
stadium.301  Additional security guards patrolling the facility may catch 
perpetrators in the act, providing probable cause or particularized 
suspicion sufficient for a Terry frisk.  One or more of these safeguards, 
although not as effective as a pat-down, could help protect spectators. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When presented with the issue, courts should recognize that 
warrantless searches at stadiums are sufficiently analogous to 
                                                                                                             
that the application of a pat-down policy on all fans at Cincinnati Bengals football games 
would “create havoc” around kickoff). 
298 Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
299 Id. at 624. 
300 Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1148 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
301 Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 657 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
Clark: Why the Airport and Courthouse Exceptions to the Search Warrant R
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
742 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
warrantless searches at airports and courthouses.  Indeed, because 
thousands more people are at risk at stadiums than at airports or 
courthouses, the need for such stadium searches may be greater.  
Because of this need and the similarities between airports, courthouses, 
and stadiums, courts should create an exception to the warrant 
requirement for stadium searches. 
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